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Abstract
In a vertically diﬀerentiated market with cost asymmetries, the risk domi-
nance criterion selects the equilibrium where the high quality is produced by
the eﬃcient ﬁrm. We show that a suﬃciently high Minimum Quality Standard
reverses equilibrium selection. Hence, MQS may be used in order to increase a
domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt at the expense of a more eﬃcient foreign rival. This pro-
duces higher domestic and lower world welfare. Since the protectionist impact
of MQS comes through equilibrium targeting rather than directly aﬀecting
equilibrium outcomes, it cannot be easily detected.
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11 Introduction
In this paper we examine the impact of a Minimum Quality Standard (MQS) on
ﬁrms’ proﬁts in a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly with cost asymmetric ﬁrms. Our
analysis applies to the case where a domestic ﬁrm faces competition from a more
eﬃcient foreign rival. We suggest that a seemingly inoﬀensive MQS may have a
strong protectionist impact by allowing an ineﬃcient domestic ﬁrm to undertake the
production of the high quality product.
In vertically diﬀerentiated markets the asymmetry in equilibrium qualities guar-
antees better proﬁt for the ﬁrm that produces the high quality, even when the ﬁrms
are symmetric in terms of cost. Provided that cost asymmetries are not too large,
the high quality producer obtains higher proﬁts even if it is less cost-eﬃcient than
its rival. Thus, instead of oﬀering an artiﬁcially higher market share to its domestic
ﬁrm through tariﬀs and import quotas, a regulator can favour that ﬁrm by simply
helping it to take up the role of the high quality producer.
For cost asymmetries that are not too large, either the less or the more eﬃcient
ﬁrm producing the high quality can be an equilibrium. The situation resembles to
an asymmetric Battle of the Sexes game, in which the only available equilibrium
selection criterion is that of Risk-Dominance (RDSC) introduced by Harsanyi and
Selten (1988). In the past few years an increasing number of studies have relied on the
RDSC. Van Huyck et al. (1990) shows empirically the RDSC to be a good predictor
of a game’s outcome. Motta et al. (1997) studies the opening of trade between two
countries and shows that in the integrated market the RDSC selects the equilibrium
where the high quality is produced by the ﬁrm that was also producing a higher
quality in autarky (persistence of quality leadership). Cabrales et al. (2000) shows
that in games of vertical diﬀerentiation with asymmetric cost, the RDSC selects the
equilibrium where the eﬃcient ﬁrm produces the high quality (and, of course, makes
2higher proﬁts), and supports this prediction experimentally. In Moraga-Gonz` alez
and Viaene (2005) (hereafter, M-V), the use of tariﬀs and subsidies increases the
relative eﬃciency of an otherwise ineﬃcient domestic ﬁrm. As a result, the RDSC
selects the equilibrium where this ﬁrm is the high quality producer.
In this paper we consider a situation where a domestic ﬁrm competes against
am o r ee ﬃcient foreign rival and show that the use of MQS can tip the RDSC
towards selecting the equilibrium that favors the domestic ﬁrm. This produces higher
d o m e s t i ca n dl o w e rw o r l dw e l f a r e .
Unlike the use of tariﬀs and subsidies considered in M-V, the MQS constitutes a
non-discriminatory policy since its impact on either the high or the low quality does
not depend on the identity (domestic-foreign) of the ﬁrm ﬁrm producing that quality.
Moreover, instead of improving domestic ﬁrm’s equilibrium payoﬀs—like most of the
well-known protectionist policies do—it operates by lowering these payoﬀsi na n y
given equilibrium. The equilibrium reversing MQS is such that, had the domestic
ﬁrm remained in the production of the low quality, it would have been eliminated
from the market. On the other hand, recall that under Bertrand competition in the
last stage, MQS have been shown to always hurt the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm producing the
high quality.1 Since in the selected equilibrium the high quality is produced by the
domestic ﬁrm, considered ex post,t h a tﬁrm’s proﬁt would have been higher in the
absence of MQS. In other words, the implementation of MQS seems to be working
against the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt, it can hardly, therefore, be accused as protectionist
measure! This conclusion neglects, of course, the role that the MQS may have played
in selecting the domestic ﬁrm’s preferred equilibrium.
1See Ronnen (1991) and Jinji and Toshimitsu (2004). As it turns out, in order to reverse
equilibrium selection the MQS must be so high that it hurts the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁte v e ni nt h e
equilibrium where the latter produces the low quality and could have been favoured by a lower
MQS.
3Several papers have investigated the impact of MQS on trade relying on a given
quality hierarchy between the domestic and the foreign ﬁrm’s product.2 The possi-
bility of quality reversals is considered in Herguera et al. (2002) and Boccard and
Wauthy (2005). However, in both these papers the reversal is due to the elimination
of one equilibrium through discriminatory treatment of the foreign ﬁrm. In the ﬁrst,
the foreign ﬁrm lowers its quality in order to reduce its anticipated tariﬀ payment
while in the second, the fact that the foreign ﬁrm faces a quota makes the domestic
ﬁrm aggressive in terms of quality choice. Equilibrium selection is exogenous in Her-
guera and Lutz (1998) where an extremely high MQS forces an ineﬃcient foreign
ﬁrm out of the market. Such MQS though cannot help the domestic ﬁrm when it has
a cost disadvantage vis-` a-vis its foreign rival and may also create strong reactions.3
By fully endogenizing equilibrium selection, the present work is, to our knowledge,
the ﬁrst to show that a non-discriminatory measure, like a MQS that does not deter
foreign entry, can induce quality leapfrogging in favour of an otherwise ineﬃcient
domestic ﬁrm.
2 The model
Consider a vertically diﬀerentiated product market where a domestic and a foreign
ﬁrm, denoted respectively as D and F, compete in prices. Consumers buy either a
single unit of a given quality or nothing at all. A consumer k purchasing quality
qi ≥ 0a tp r i c epi, i = D,F, has utility
2E.g. Das and Donnenfeld (1989), Boom (1995), and Fisher and Serra (2000).
3In the late 1990’s the Canadian government tried to set suﬃciently high health standards that
would eliminate imports of cheese from non-pasteurized milk, in which French producers had cost




while the utility in the case of non-purchase is zero. Each consumer is character-
ized by θ
i, his willingness to pay for quality increments; the θ’s of the entire consumer
population are distributed uniformly on the [0,1] interval.
Variable production costs are constant, independent of quality, equal for both
ﬁrms and for simplicity assumed also equal to zero. The choice of a given quality




where λi represents ﬁrm i’s technology, i = D,F. We assume that the foreign
ﬁrm is more eﬃcient and set, without loss of generality, 1 = λF ≤ λD = λ.F i r m s
play a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage they choose simultaneously their respective
quality level In the second stage they choose simultaneously their price. Quality
decisions are observable by both rivals before price decisions are made. Firm i is
allowed to choose qi =0i nt h eﬁrst stage, which corresponds to the no-entry option.
When qi =0a n dqj 6= 0, at the second stage ﬁrm j acts as a monopolist. The
solution concept adopted is that of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Taking qualities as given we have two possible kinds of subgames according to
whether it is the foreign or the domestic ﬁrm that produces the high quality.4 The
superscript i = F,D, characterizes the subgame by indicating the ﬁrm that produces
the high quality in the subgame considered. As before, subscripts characterize ﬁrms,
so similar (diﬀerent) superscript and subscript indicate the high (low) quality pro-
ducer in the subgame. Starting from the price stage, we compute optimal prices as































Substituting optimal prices back into the proﬁt functions we obtain proﬁts as














































j =1 ,λ.I ti simportant to note that λF =1 ,a n dλD = λ
whatever the subgame considered, i.e. whatever the superscript.
































Expressions (3) and (4) represent two systems of two equations in two unknowns.
Within each subgame one should now obtain reaction functions in the quality space
and from them the equilibrium qualities of the subgame. However, this task proves
to be extremely complex at an analytical level. For this reason we re-write (3) and













−8ri +1 2 ri2 − 16ri3
(1 − 4ri)3 ,( 5 )
5The procedure is very standard and therefore, omitted. Second order conditions are respected
(full proofs available by the authors).
6We do not assign qualities to ﬁrms since this will be endogenously determined. According to










(1 − 4ri)3 (6)













i +8 )=0 ( 7 )
Solving Eq.(7) and substituting the equilibrium value of ri back to Eq.(5) and
Eq.(6) we obtain equilibrium qualities and proﬁts for both ﬁrms, denoted with a
∗.L e t EF =( qF∗
F ,qF∗
D )a n dED =( qD∗
D ,qD∗
F ) represent the equilibrium of each
reduced form subgame where the role of the high quality producer has been ex-
ogenously assigned to the foreign and domestic ﬁrm, respectively. Obviously, in
a pure strategy equilibrium each ﬁrm will choose among its equilibrium strategies
in the subgames, therefore, we only need to consider the set ωF = {qF∗
F ,qD∗
F } for
ﬁrm F and the set ωD = {qF∗
D ,qD∗
D } for ﬁrm D in order to ﬁnd equilibria for the
entire game. Let aHL ≡ πF
F(qF∗
F ,qF∗
D ), aHH ≡ πF(qF∗
F ,qD∗
D ), aLL ≡ πF(qD∗
F ,qF∗
D ),
and aLH ≡ πF(qD∗
F ,qD∗
D )r e p r e s e n tﬁrm F’s payoﬀs from all possible combinations
of the four strategies that can be part of a subgame equilibrium. In an analo-
gous manner, let bHL ≡ πF
D(qF∗
F ,qF∗
D ), bHH ≡ πD(qF∗
F ,qD∗





D ) represent the corresponding payoﬀso fﬁrm D.7 Hence, the payoﬀ
matrix of the entire game can be summarized as:
7Firm F’s (D’s) payoﬀs are indicated by a (b). The ﬁrst letter in the payoﬀ subscripts indicates
the strategy of ﬁrm F while the second, that of ﬁrm D. In order to avoid heavy notation in
subscripts we denote each ﬁrm’s strategies by H,L a c c o r d i n gt ow h e t h e rt h eﬁrm acts as the high
or the low quality producer. For instance, bHL indicates ﬁrm D’s payoﬀ when ﬁrm F acts as
high quality producer and ﬁrm D as low quality producer. It needs to be recalled that ﬁrm F’s
H-strategy is qF∗
F 6= qD∗
D which is ﬁrm D’s H-strategy.
7  Firm  D   
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Hereafter, we assume that λ ≤ λ ' 1.6, which, according to Zhou et al. (2002),
implies that both EF and ED are equilibria of the entire game. Thus, at the begining
of the game ﬁrm i needs to anticipate the subgame that will be played in order to
choose between its strategies in ωi, i = F,D. According to Harsanyi and Selten
(1988) the focal point will be the equilibrium that, if wrongly neglected, reduces
payoﬀs more sharply. This is the main idea behind the Risk Dominance Selection
Criterion (RDSC) which selects equilibrium EF (ED)w h e n 8
RD(λ)=( aHL − aLL)(bHL − bHH) − (aLH − aHH)(bLH − bLL) > (<)0
The term (aHL−aLL) can be interpreted as the net gain for ﬁrm F from correctly
anticipating the qF∗
D move from its rival rather than wrongly anticipating qD∗
D and
playing accordingly. The term (bHL − bHH) represents the corresponding net gain
for ﬁrm D.H e n c e ,t h e ﬁrst product in the above expression shows how important
is for the two ﬁrms not to play wrong if their rival is going to play the strategy
corresponding to EF. Similarly, the second product shows the importance of correctly
anticipating ED when the rival is going to play his strategy corresponding to ED.9
Cabrales et al. (2000) show that in games of vertical diﬀerentiation with asym-
metric cost the RDSC selects the equilibrium where the quality leader is the low
8Notice also that none of the subgame equilibria is Pareto optimal, therefore the only available
equilibrium-selection criterion is the RDSC. An alternative would have been an equilibrium in
mixed strategies.
9Since both EF and ED are Nash equilibria the terms in parenthesis are all positive. For a more
detailed discussion of the criterion the reader can see Motta et al.( 1997).
8cost ﬁrm. In our context, this implies that EF risk-dominates ED, i.e., that it is
the foreign competitor who will produce the high quality and enjoy higher proﬁts.
The domestic government can reverse this outcome by using discriminatory measures
against the foreign ﬁrm (tariﬀs, quotas or subsidies to the domestic ﬁrm, as in M-V).
Such measures, however, invite retaliation and may be constrained by international
agreements.
Consider now the imposition of a MQS at a quality level e q. The following results
are known to hold under Bertrand competition in the last stage:10 a) as long as both
qualities remain in the market, the proﬁt of the high quality decreases monotonically
with e q;b )t h ep r o ﬁt of the low quality, while initially increasing in e q, past a certain
level it becomes monotonically decreasing. Moreover, c) unless there is an abrupt
change in market structure, the proﬁt of the low quality is continuous in e q;d )a
MQS equal to the high quality generates no revenues, due to Bertrand competition
in homogeneous products. Combining b), c) and d) implies the existence in every
subgame i = F,D,o fae q ≡ qi >q i∗
j , such that πi
j(qi,q i∗
i (qi
j)) = 0 and ∀e q>qi,
πi
j(qi,qi∗
i (qi)) = 0. We term as radical MQS any e q>qi; obviously, a radical MQS
induces exit of the lower quality in the subgame.11 Let a tildeeon a variable indicate
its equilibrium value in the presence of MQS. The value of qi as function of the high


















j(1 − 4ri)2 (8)




j. If the low quality decides to remain in the market, the




j by e q. Dividing Eq.(5) by Eq.(8) and re-arranging terms, we obtain the
10The ﬁrst two are due to Ronnen, 1991.
11Leapfrogging is ruled out within a subgame as it leads to the other subgame.













)=0 ( 9 )
which is equivalent to expression (7) in the unconstrained case. We solve Eq.(9) for








Since for e q ≥ qi the low quality makes nonpositive proﬁts and exits the market, the
high quality producer chooses the same quality that a monopolist would choose, i.e.,
e qi
i = qi
M, provided of course that the latter is higher than e q. Lemma 1 below provides
a technical result necessary for what follows.
Lemma 1: For all λ ≤ λ, qF < qD.
Proof. Note that in the EF equilibrium the MQS applies to the domestic ﬁrm
and vice-versa for ED. Since the domestic ﬁrm is less cost eﬃcient, it needs more
diﬀerentiation in order to survive, therefore, for any given high quality qF < qD.
However, the high quality is not the same in the two subgames: ∀e q, e qF
F > e qD
D, due
again to the higher eﬃciency of the foreign ﬁrm. Thus, we have two eﬀects working in
opposite directions and we need to proceed computationally. The proof is obtained
numerically by computing qD, qF, for all relevant values of λ.12 Figure 1 reports these
results.
Now we are able to show that:
Proposition 1 : ∀λ ∈ (1,1.09],R D(e q) < 0, ∀e q in the neighborhood to the right of
qF.
12Figure 1 constitutes full proof since it computes for all values of λ and not just a sample of such
values. Unfortunately, from the moment qualities and/or the RDSC need to be determined one can
only hope to ﬁnd numerical solutions, as this has always been common practice in the literature
(see for instance, Motta, 1993, Motta et al., 1997, or Moraga-Gonz` alez and Viaene, 2005 ).
10Proof. We compute RD(qF) for all relevant values of λ (see Appendix 1). From
Figure 2 which reports these results it is clear that RD(qF) < 0.13 It is easy to see
that within a given market structure all the payoﬀs are continuous in e q and so is
RD(e q). Therefore, there exists an interval in the right neighborhood of qF in which
RD(e q) < 0, Q.E.D.
The solid line in Figure 3a shows the typical evolution of RD as function of
the MQS.14 Part b of the ﬁgure computes RD for all e q in the (qF,qD) interval, for
λ =1 .05. When ﬁrms are symmetric, qF = qD = q and any e q ≥ q induces monopoly
of one or the other ﬁrm. With asymmetric ﬁrms, all levels of MQS between qF and
qD instead of resulting in a monopoly of the eﬃcient ﬁrm, they induce a role switch
and result in a duopoly where the ineﬃcient ﬁrm produces the high quality. This is
a point that has been neglected in the literature.15
That RD becomes abruptly negative when e q reaches qF and the domestic ﬁrm is
forced out of the market in the EF equilibrium, is not a coincidence. The dashed line
in Figure 3a shows the value of RD, l e ti tb ed RD(e q), in the hypothetical case where
13Since at e q = qF the domestic ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between staying or exiting the market, RD(qF)
may take two values, one positive, the other negative. Following convention and the fact that
RD(qF + ε) < 0, for any ε arbitrarily small, we consider that at e q = qF the low quality exits the
market in EF.
14Due to scale problems, ﬁgure 1a is “drawn” instead of being the result of computations based
on speciﬁc parameter values. What is important is that in all the computations we performed, RD
had the shape presented in ﬁgure 1a.
15As a matter of fact, one can show numerically that for λ ≤ 1.09 RD remains negative in
t h ee n t i r ei n t e r v a l( qF,qD)( f o rλ ≤ 1.085) or in the neighborhood to the right of qF, while for
1.09 ≤ λ ≤ 1.6 the RDSC becomes again positive for all values of e q (computations available by the
authors). These results are of little importance as long as the regulator cares about the domestic
ﬁrm’s proﬁt, since the latter decreases monotonically with e q in the ED equilibrium. They have
some importance when total domestic welfare is considered (see below).
11the domestic ﬁrm is not allowed to exit the market, despite its negative proﬁts.
Note that ∀e q ∈
£
qF,qD¤
, d RD(e q) > 0, which implies that, had the domestic ﬁrm
been forced to stay in the market in the EF equilibrium, it would most likely have
ended up as the low quality producer in the equilibrium of the entire game. As
revealed by Table 1, which compares the elements of d RD and RD for λ =1 .05
and e q = qF, exit reduces RD by substantially reducing the (aHL − aLL)t e r m . 16
The latter represents the proﬁtd i ﬀerence for the foreign ﬁrm between choosing the
optimal versus a suboptimal quality, given qD
D. As long as the low quality stays in
the market, such a mistake has both a direct eﬀect and, most importantly, a strategic
eﬀect on the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁt. When e q ≥ qF, the domestic ﬁrm’s exit in the EF
equilibrium eliminates the strategic eﬀect and therefore makes this diﬀerence much
less signiﬁcant: wrongly ignoring the EF equilibrium is no longer that damaging for
the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁt as wrongly ignoring ED.17
What we have shown, so far, is that a carefully selected MQS allows the domestic
ﬁrm to make more proﬁt than its foreign rival. This, of course, is not per se a policy
objective. Bearing in mind the results of Ronnen (1991)18 the regulator needs to
examine whether the domestic ﬁrm is better-oﬀ with the MQS that maximizes its
16The results of the table 1 are qualitatively robust in varying λ.
17More rigorously, the term (aHL − aLL) can be approximated as dπF = dπF
dqF dqF,w h e r edqF =
qF∗
F −qD∗
F . Let a hatb characterize all relevant variables in the EF (e q) equilibrium when the domestic
ﬁrm is constrained not to exit the market. Note ﬁrst that |db qF| > |de qF|: due to the strategic eﬀect,
b qF∗
F > e qF∗
F , while b qD∗
F = e qD∗
F = e q.A l s o ,de πF
dqF = ∂e πF
∂qF while db πF
dqF = ∂b πF
∂qF + ∂b πF
∂pD
∂pD




(the strategic eﬀect of quality choice). On the other hand, exit reduces the domestic ﬁrm’s damage
from wrongly anticipating EF (e q),i.e., (b bLH −b bLL) > (e bLH −e bLL),it tends, therefore, to make the
EF (e q) equilibrium more likely. This second eﬀect of exit on RD is always less signiﬁcant than the
ﬁrst..
18I.e., that a MQS a) always reduces the proﬁt of the high quality, and b) if set at a moderate
level increases the proﬁt of the low quality.
12proﬁt as low quality producer or with the MQS that reverses equilibrium selection.
Let maxe π
F
D represent the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt in the former case. The following
proposition clears the issue:
Proposition 2 : ∀e q ∈ (qF,qD), πD
D(e q) > maxe π
F
D.
Proof. We compute πD
D(e q = qF)a n dm a x e π
F
D for all relevant values of λ.T h e
results are reported in Figure 4 where one can see that ∀λ ∈ (1,1.09], πD
D(e q = qF) >
maxe π
F
D. Since the proﬁt of the high quality ﬁrm is a decreasing function of MQS,
we also compute πD
D(e q = qD) which again is higher than maxe π
F
D.T h u s ,a n y M Q S
that reverses the equilibrium increases the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt, QED.
Notice that, while a mild MQS can also have a positive impact on πF
D,t h el o c a l
ﬁrm beneﬁts a lot more from any MQS that reverses equilibrium selection. Further-
more, recall that the proﬁt of the high quality is always lower in the presence of
MQS (Ronnen, 1991). Hence, had the domestic ﬁrm been able to secure its role as
the high quality producer by some other means, it would have preferred the MQS
to be abolished. In other words, given that the production of the high quality has
been attributed to the domestic ﬁrm, the presence of MQS hurts the domestic ﬁrm’s
proﬁt ,a n de v e nm o r es o ,s i n c ei th a sb e e ni m p o s e da tav e r yh i g hl e v e l .T h e r e f o r e ,
MQS can hardly be accused as being a protectionist measure. What this argument
obscures is, of course, the role of MQS in aﬀecting equilibrium selection.
To this point we have implicitly assumed that the regulator cares only about
the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt, perhaps for being subject to intense lobbying from the
producer. In such scenario, the optimal choice of MQS is obviously just above
qF. In what follows, we show that the regulator that maximizes domestic welfare
will also choose a MQS that reverses equilibrium selection, albeit higher than the
13MQS that maximizes domestic proﬁt. Any such choice, however, does not maximize
world welfare. In particular, we show that MQS choices that reverse equilibrium







C,j= F,D, represent word welfare, domestic welfare, and (domestic)
consumer surplus, respectively, in each equilibrium. Let also e q1,e q2 be any two values
of e q such that e q1 < qF < e q2 < qD.19 Then,
Proposition 3 When the equilibrium is selected according the RDSC, i) ∀{e q1,e q2}
WD(e q2) >W D(e q1); ii) ∃ξ > 0 such that ∀{e q1,e q2} with e q1 ∈
¡
qF − ξ,qF¢
, WW(e q2) <
WW(e q1); iii) ∃ζ > 0 such that ∀{e q1,e q2} with e q1 ∈
¡
qF − ζ,qF¢
, WC(e q2) <W C(e q1).
Proof. The proof of the proposition consists of showing that, according to the
RDSC, the evolution of WD(e q), WW(e q), and WC(e q)is as shown in Figures 5a , 5b,a n d
5c, respectively. In the appendix it is shown that within each equilibrium, EF,ED,
as long as both ﬁrms remain active (i.e., ∀e q<qj)a )dW
j
i /de q>0,i= F,D,
j = W, D, C, (lemma 2), and b)W F
W(e q) >W D
W(e q), W F
C (e q) >W D
C (e q) while W F
D(e q) <
WD
D(e q) (lemma 3). These results imply that at e q = qF, WD(e q) jumps upwards, which
suﬃces for the proof of part i). They also imply that WW(e q) and WC(e q) have a
downward jump. For ii) we also need that W F
W(qF) >W D
W(qD), and, similarly, for
iii) that W F
C (qF) >WD
C (qD), both shown to hold in the appendix, QED.
Thus, if the domestic regulator is interested in either domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁto r
total domestic welfare, he must choose a MQS in the
¡
qF,qD¢
region. If the target is
to maximize former, the MQS must be just to the right of qF, while for maximizing
the latter an MQS just to the left of qD must be chosen. Any value between these two
extremes may be optimal when domestic proﬁt wheighs more than consumer surplus
19Only eﬀective levels of MQS are considered.
14in the regulator’s welfare function.20 In all cases the MQS is too high relative to
what maximizes domestic consumer surplus and world welfare. Any MQS beyond qD
establishes a monopoly of the foreign ﬁrm and, therefore, lowers domestic welfare.21
3C o n c l u s i o n
In a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly with asymmetric ﬁrms, unless cost asymme-
tries are too large, there exist two equilibria. Without MQS, the RDSC selects the
equilibrium where the more eﬃcient ﬁrm produces the high quality (see Cabrales et
al., 2000) . Within this equilibrium, there exists a level of MQS, qF,s u ﬃciently high
as to induce exit of the less eﬃcient ﬁrm (low quality producer) and market monop-
olization. However, this conclusion is based either on cost symmetric ﬁrms (Ronnen,
1991) or on an exogenous choice of equilibrium (Jinji and Toshimitsu, 2004). We
h a v es h o w nt h a tw i t ha s y m m e t r i cﬁrms, a MQS at the qF level, or slightly above, tips
the RDSC towards selecting the equilibrium where the less eﬃcient ﬁrm produces
the high quality: both ﬁrms remain in the market and the less eﬃcient ﬁrm makes
higher proﬁts.22
Our analysis suggests that an appropriately chosen MQS can be used in order
20Because at qF t h ej u m pi nt h ev a l u eo fd o m e s t i cp r o ﬁts is substantial, e q = qF may be optimal
even when consumer surplus weighs more (but not that much more) than proﬁt. When the regulator




21Now, both consumer surplus and domestic proﬁt are reduced, not only compared to situations
with e q ∈
¡
qF,qD¢
, but also compared to MQS lying in the left neighborhood of qF.
22If one keeps increasing the level of MQS, a second equilibrium reversal will occur at qD > qF
and the less eﬃcient ﬁrm will be eventually eliminated. Traditional intuition remains, therefore,
ultimately valid. What our analysis suggests is that a) market monopolization will occur at levels
of MQS higher than expected, and b) at some MQS levels expected to eliminate the less eﬃcient
ﬁrm, the latter will instead make higher proﬁts by producing the high quality.
15to target the equilibrium that confers a domestic ﬁrm higher proﬁta tt h ee x p e n s e
o fam o r ee ﬃcient foreign rival. Since a MQS always hurts high quality proﬁts,
once the equilibrium is selected the presence of MQS appears to reduce the proﬁt
of the domestic producer (who is now producing the high quality). What the above
argument hides is, of course, the role of the MQS in selecting the equilibrium that is
more favorable to the domestic ﬁrm. Hence, compared to other measures aiming to
protect domestic producers, the protectionist action of the MQS is less obvious and
creates less friction with international agreements.
Admittedly, like in almost all the papers in the related literature,23 some of our
crucial results rely on numerical analysis, for it is practically impossible to analyti-
cally compute the value of RDSC. This should not obscure the value of this paper’s
main intuition, namely that in asymmetric vertical diﬀerentiation models, a) analyz-
ing policy measures whithin an exogenously selected equilibrium may be seriously
misleading, and b) equilibrium targeting may be a policy objective per se.
Let us ﬁnally note that equilibrium targeting may apply in a more general context
than that of the MQS, presented in this paper. First, our main results are qualita-
tively unaltered if we consider that in the second stage ﬁrms compete in quantities
(as in Valletti, 2000). Second, it is conceivable that the players themselves engage in
equilibrium targeting by selecting speciﬁc actions prior to the game. For example,
one can imagine a three stage game where in the ﬁrst stage some ﬁrm (or both ﬁrms)
make strategic choices in order to tip the RDSC towards their favored outcome in
subsequent stages. Investigating such possibility features in our research agenta.
23E.g., Motta (1993), Echia and Lambertini (1997), Scarpa (1998), Motta et al., (1997), or
Moraga-Gonz` alez and Viaene (2005), among others.
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18Figures:
Figure 1: The evolution of qD,qFwith λ, ∀λ ∈ (1,1.6).
Figure 2: RD
¡
e q = qF¢
for λ ∈ (1,1.1).
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Figure 3a: RD(e q) for all values of the MQS. Figure 3b: RD(e q) for all relevant




for λ =1 .05.
19  RD   aHL-aLL  bHL-bHH a LH-aHH b LH-bLL 
Exit is allowed  5 6.5 10
− −×   0.03125 - 0.01888 
=0.01237 
0 - (-0.03249) 
=0.03249 
0.00014 - (-0.03105) 
=0.03119 
0.01496 - 0 
=0.01496 
Exit is not 
allowed 
5 91 0
− ×   0.01661- (-0.00430) 
=0.02091 
0 - (-0.03213) 
=0.03213 
0.00014 - (-0.02975) 
=0.02989 
0.01496 - (-0.00451) 
=0.01947 
 
Table 1: The components of RD according to wether is or is not allowed, for λ=1.05
and e q = qF(λ =1 .05).
Figure 4: πD
D(qF)a n dm a xe π
F
D for λ ∈ (1,1.09).
Figure 5a: WW(e q) for λ =1 .05 Figure 5b: WD(e q) for λ =1 .05
for all eﬀective values of the MQS for all eﬀective values of the MQS
20Figure 6: WC(e q) for λ =1 .05 for all eﬀective values of the MQS
21Appendix 1
W ei m p o s eaM Q Sa tal e v e le q = qF(λ), so that it will be restrictive in the EF and
ED equilibrium, and the ﬁrm D will go out of business in the EF equilibrium. Hence,




4, is derived accordingly. We have e qD
D = qD
D(qF,λ), e qD
F = qF(λ), and
e qF
D = 0. Combining the Eq.(8) and (9) we obtain qF(λ), e qD
D is given by Eq.(3).
The pay-oﬀs under the presence of qF are:
g bHL =0



























































g aLL = πF(qF)=1
4(qF − 2qF2)
Based on the corresponding expressions for optimal qualities and the previous




for the all values of λ. This yields that
∀λ ∈ [1,1.09], RD(qF(λ),λ) < 0.
Appendix 2: P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
In order to prove the proposition we need to show two auxiliary results. In what
follows we only consider levels of e q f o rw h i c ht h eM Q Si se ﬀective, thus, the lower





i (e q,λ),e q,λ)=( 2 qi
i − e q)Á(4qi
i − e q),i= F,D,
represent the taste parameter of the consumer just indiﬀerent between buying the











i − e q)Á(4qi
i − e q) the taste parameter of the consumer just indiﬀerent between












































































Lemma 2: In any subgame equilibrium, as long as both ﬁrms are active we have
dW i
k/de q>0,k= W,D,C, i = F,D













de q > 0 we examine separately
the sign of each term in the middle part. From Ronnen, 1991, we know that
dqF
F



















3 − 1.09 ∗ 0.1
since λ =1 .09 is the highest value of λ considered (see Proposition 1) and






F e q2+109e q3
(4qF
F −e q)
3 > 0 for e q<0.72qF
F.
The latter is always true since e q<0.1 < 0.72 × q∗F
F < 0.72 × qF
F for all level










dλ < 0 (see Zhou and al., 2000 and
2002) and q∗F
F (λ =1 .09) = 0.2528 then e q<0.1 < 0.72 × q∗F
F for all level of λ
considered, and b) as
dqF
F


















F is the marginal cost (with respect to quality) of the foreign ﬁrm.
Since we are only interested in equilibrium situations, marginal cost can be
24It can be easily shown that qD (λ) is decreasing in λ and that qD (1)=qF (1) < 0.1.
25q∗F
F is the high quality in EF equilibrium without SQM.








the latter for qF





























































de q > 0 we examine separately the
















2 −(1.09∗0.1) > 0.001
2756qF2
F +872qF





















de q > 0.













de q > 0 we examine separately the sign

























D is the marginal cost (with respect to quality) of the domestic
ﬁrm. Since we are only interested in equilibrium situations, marginal cost can








the latter for λqD


























D e q−5e q2
(4qD
D−e q)
3 > 0f o re q<
4
5qF




de q > 0.













de q > 0 we examine separately the





















F e q−5e q2
(4qF
F −e q)
3 > 0f o re q<4
5qF




de q > 0a n d
dWD
C
de q > 0.
Lemma 3: ∀e q ≤ qF, i) W F
W(e q) >W D
W(e q), ii)W F
C (e q) >W D




Proof. i) We prove that ∀e q ≤ qF,a )W F
P (e q) >WD
P (e q), with W
j
P the sum of both
ﬁrms proﬁti nb o t hEF,ED equilibria, and b) W F
C (e q) >WD
C (e q).
a) The proﬁt of the producer of high quality (noted πh in this proof) corresponds
to πF
F in the equilibrium EF,a n dπD
D in the equilibrium ED. ∀e q ≤ qF,w eh a v e




2 .I nEF, the producer of high quality is ﬁrm F,w eh a v e ,
therefore, qh = qF
F and λh = λF =1 .I nED the producer of high quality is ﬁrm D,
thus we have qh = qD
D and λh = λD > 1.
The proﬁt of the low quality producer (denoted as πl in this proof) corresponds to
πF
D in equilibrium EF and πD
F in equilibrium ED. ∀e q ≤ qF we have πl =




2 .I nEF the producer of low quality is ﬁrm D, we have therefore, λl = λD > 1,
in ED the producer of low quality is the ﬁrm F,w eh a v eλl = λF =1 .
The variations of πh and πl between both equilibria EF and ED are the conse-
quence of a positive variation of λh (i.e. λD −1), and a negative variation of λl (i.e.
1 − λD).





















∂qh =0 , ∂πl
∂qh = e q2 2qh+e q
(4qh−e q)3 > 0,
dqh

















P (e q) >W D
P (e q).
b) The variation of consumer surplus between both equilibriums EF and ED is
the consequence of the positive variation of λh,a n dt h enegative variation of λl.
















(2qh2+qh e q)(4qh−5e q)
(4qh−e q)3 > 0( ∀λ ∈ (1,1.09], we have e q<4
5qh),
dqh
dλh < 0a n d
dqh








dλh < 0, W F
C (e q) >WD
C (e q).
ii) It is proved by i) b).
iii) For λ =1 ,t h e n∀e q ≤ qF we have WF
C (e q)=W D
C (e q), πF
D(e q) < πD
D(e q)a n d
WF
D(e q) <W D
D(e q). When λ increases we have WF
C (e q) >W D
C (e q) (see ii) and πF
D(e q) <
πD
D(e q). As W F
C (e q), W D
C (e q), πF
D(e q), πD
D(e q)a r ec o n t i n o u si nλ,w em a ys a yt h a tf o rλ
marginally superior to 1, WF
D(e q) <W D
D(e q).




C (qF) >W D
C (qD). The following ﬁgures demonstrate it.
Figure A1: W F
W(qF) and W D
W(qD) for λ =1 .05 Figure A2: WF
C (qF) and W D
C (qD)
for λ =1 .05
26